On the Concept of a Notational Variant by Kocurek, Alexander W.
On the Concept of a Notational Variant*
Alex Kocurek For the 6th International Workshop in Logic, Rationality, and Interaction.
Abstract. In the study ofmodal and nonclassical logics, translations have frequently been employed
as a way of measuring the inferential capabilities of a logic. It is sometimes claimed that two logics
are “notational variants” if they are translationally equivalent. However, we will show that this
cannot be quite right, since first-order logic and propositional logic are translationally equivalent.
Others have claimed that for two logics to be notational variants, they must at least be composi-
tionally intertranslatable. The definition of compositionality these accounts use, however, is too
strong, as the standard translation frommodal logic to first-order logic is not compositional in this
sense. In light of this, we will explore a weaker version of this notion that we will call schematicity
and show that there is no schematic translation either from first-order logic to propositional logic
or from intuitionistic logic to classical logic.
§1 Introduction
In the study of modal and nonclassical logics, translations (maps between formulas that
faithfully preserve consequence) are frequently employed as a way of measuring the infer-
ential capabilities of a logic. Examples of well-known translations in the literature include:
(a) the double-negation translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic;
(b) the standard translation of modal logic into first-order logic;
(c) the Gödel translation of intuitionistic logic into classical S4.
These translations are often taken to show that the logic being translated can be viewed
as a “notational variant” of a fragment of the logic it is translated into. Indeed, a number
of authors have conjectured that translational equivalence is a necessary and/or sufficient
condition for two logics to be notational variants in the intuitive sense.1
Unfortunately, most of these accounts of notational variance are either too weak or too
strong. For instance, on any reasonable theory of notational variance, first-order logic and
propositional logic are not notational variants. However, wewill show in §3 that first-order
logic and propositional logic are translationally equivalent. Thus, any account which says
translational equivalence is sufficient for notational variance2 is too weak.
On the other hand, some have suggested that for two logics to be considered notational
variants, theymust at least be compositionally intertranslatable, in a sense that will be made
*Thanks to Wes Holliday and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback on this paper.
1For claims like this, see Wójcicki [1988, p. 67], Epstein [1990, p. 391], Pelletier and Urquhart [2003, p. 269],
Caleiro and Gonçalves [2007, p. 108], Straßburger [2007, p. 139], Mossakowski et al. [2009, p. 7], and French
[2010, p. 134].
2E.g., Straßburger [2007, p. 139], Mossakowski et al. [2009, p. 7], and French [2010, p. 134].
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precise in §4.3 Since there is no compositional translation from first-order logic to proposi-
tional logic, the former is not a notational variant of the latter in this sense. However, these
accounts of notational variance are too strong, since on their definition of composition-
ality, even the standard translation (in fact, any translation) of modal logic into first-order
logic is not compositional. Near the end of this paper, a generalization of this notion called
schematicity that avoids these problems will be proposed, and we will show that there is
no schematic translation from first-order logic to propositional logic, or from intuitionistic
logic to classical logic.
§2 Defining Translations
We start by defining the concept of a logic and a translation in abstract terms.
Definition 2.1 (Logic). A logic is a pair L  xL ;(y where L is a nonempty class (of
formulas) and ( } (L)  L (the consequence relation) such that:
(i) ( is reflexive, i.e., for all  P L,  ( 
(ii) ( is transitive, i.e., for all  ;  L and all  P L, if   (  and if  (  for
each  P  , then  ( .
Where ;  P L, we will say  and  are L-equivalent, written “   ”, if  (  
and  ( . We will say that  is L-valid, written “( ”, ifH ( . If L is a logic,
we may write “(L” and “L” for the consequence and equivalence relations for L
respectively. We may also write “(i” instead of “(Li”, “i” instead of “Li”, etc.
This notion of a logic is meant to be fairly general. While it can be generalized even
further (allowing for substructural logics, multiple-conclusion logics, etc.), such general-
izations will not concern us here. Classical, intuitionistic, modal, and predicate logics can
all be viewed as logics in the sense ofDefinition 2.1.
Next, we define the concept of a translation.
Definition 2.2 (Translation). Let L1 and L2 be logics. A translation from L1 to L2 is a
map t : L1 Ñ L2 such that for all    L1 and  P L1,   (1  iff tr s (2 t(). If t is
a translation from L1 to L2, wewill write “t : L1 L2”. Wewill say L1 is translatable
into L2, written as “L1 L2”, if there is a translation from L1 to L2. We will say L1
and L2 are intertranslatable, written as “L1   L2”, if L1 L2 and L2 L1.
Example 2.3 (Double-Negation Translation). Define At  tp0 ; p1 ; p2 ; : : :u. Let LProp be
the set of formulas defined recursively over At as follows:
 F p | : | ( ^ ):
3E.g., Wójcicki [1988, p. 67], Epstein [1990, p. 391], Pelletier and Urquhart [2003, p. 269], and Caleiro and
Gonçalves [2007, p. 108].
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Let CPL be classical propositional logic over LProp, and let IPL be intuitionistic
propositional logic over LProp(_;Ñ), i.e., the result of extending LProp with con-
nectives _ andÑ. Define t() B ::. Then t : CPL IPL.
Example 2.4 (Standard Translation). Let Var  tx0 ; x1 ; x2 ; : : :u (the set of variables)
and for each n P , let Predn  tPn0 ; Pn1 ; Pn2 ; : : :u (the set of n-place predicates).
Define LPred to be the set of formulas defined recursively as follows:
 F Pn (y1 ; : : : ; yn) | : | ( ^ ) | @x :
Let FOL be classical first-order logic over LPred. Define LProp(◻) to be the set of
formulas defined recursively over At as follows:
 F p | : | ( ^ ) | ◻:
Let K be the minimal normal modal logic over LProp(◻). Where R is an arbitrarily
chosen binary predicate and where n P , we define the map STn from proposi-
tional modal formulas to first-order formulas as follows:
STn (pi)  P1i (xn)
STn (:)  : STn ()
STn ( ^  )  (STn () ^ STn ( ))
STn (◻)  @xn 1 (R(xn ; xn 1) Ñ STn 1()) :
Then STn : K FOL.
Example 2.5 (Non-normal Modal Logics). A modal logic over LProp(◻) is said to be
monotonic if it contains all classical tautologies as well as the axiom ◻(p ^ q) Ñ
(◻p^◻q) and it is closed under uniform substitution, modus ponens, and the rule
 Ø  {◻ Ø ◻ . Kracht and Wolter Kracht and Wolter [1999, p. 109, Theo-
rem 4.7] showed that the following map is a translation from any monotonic modal
logic to a normal bimodal logic (i.e., a modal logic over the languageLProp(◻1 ;◻2),
where each ◻i is a normal modal operator):
t(p)  p
t(:)  : t()
t( ^  )  t() ^ t( )
t(◻)  ◇1◻2t():
Thomason Thomason [1974, 1975] also shows how to translate any tense logic into a
normal (mono)modal logic, though the translation is too complex to state succinctly
here.
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Logicians have typically taken the existence of such translations to show that the source
logic is a mere notational variant of a fragment of the target logic. Gödel [1933] (reprinted
in Gödel [1986]) says of the translation from CPL to IPL:
If to the primitive notions ofHeyting’s propositional calculuswe let correspond
those notions of the classical propositional calculus that are denoted by the
same sign and if to absurdity (:) we let correspond negation (), then the in-
tuitionistic propositional calculus H turns out to be a proper subsystem of the
ordinary propositional calculusA. With another correlation (translation) of the
notions, however, the classical propositional calculus is, conversely, a subsystem of
the intuitionistic one. Gödel [1986, p. 287]
Blackburn et al. [2001, p. xi] say of the standard translation frommodal logic to first-order
logic:
By adopting the perspective of correspondence theory, modal logic can be re-
garded as a fragment of first- or second-order classical logic.
Kracht and Wolter [1999, p. 100] informally explain the significance of their result that
monotonic modal logics are translatable into normal bimodal logics as follows:
The positive results on simulations [i.e., translations] show that there is no es-
sential difference between the classes of monomodal normal logics, monotonic
logics, and polymodal logics.
Finally, Thomason [1975, p. 154] summarizes his result that tense logics are translatable
into normal (mono)modal logics as follows:
In general terms, these resultswould seem to indicate that there is nothing to be
gained by consideringmanymodalities rather than just one, except simplicity—
anything which can be expressed about the universe in terms of many notions
of necessity can be expressed in terms of one, very complex, notion of necessity,
by a translation which preserves both the semantic and syntactic consequence
relations.
Although we will show that translations between logics are fairly easy to come by,
there are non-trivial failures of translatability. For instance, Jeřábek [2012, p. 672] showed
that there is no translation from CPL to the logic of paradox LP. As another example, the
following is readily verified:
Proposition 2.6. If L1 L2, then L2 is compact only if L1 is.
From this, it follows that second-order logic is not translatable into first-order logic. More-
over, as the next example shows, there are pairs of logics such that neither logic is trans-
latable into the other.4
4This thereby answers a question posed byEpstein [1990, p. 388] in the affirmative. It is also straightforward
to generate artificial counterexamples using any two partial orders such that neither is order-embeddable in
the other.
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Example 2.7 (Kleene Logic). LetK3 be the strongKleene logic overLProp. Let uswrite
CPLn and K3n for the logics obtained from CPL and K3 respectively by restricting
the set of formulas to those whose atomics are all among tp1 ; : : : ; pnu. Then nei-
ther CPLn nor K3n is translatable into the other. CPLn is not translatable into K3n
since there are no tautologies in K3n (this generalizes to CPL and K3). And K3n is
not translatable into CPLn since the former has strictly more formulas up to equiv-
alence than the latter (this does not generalize to CPL and K3; in fact, K3 CPL by
Theorem 3.5 below).
One might conjecture that two logics are notational variants if they are intertranslat-
able. However, a number of authors have claimed that intertranslatability is not enough
for two logics to be properly called “notational variants”. Rather, they must additionally
be translationally equivalent in the following sense:5
Definition 2.8 (Translational Equivalence). Let L1 and L2 be logics. We will say that
xt1 ; t2y is a translation scheme between L1 and L2 (written as “t1 ; t2 : L1! L2”) if
t1 : L1 L2 and t2 : L2 L1 and for all  P L1 and all  P L2:
t2(t1()) 1 
t1(t2( )) 2  :
L1 and L2 are translationally equivalent (written “L1!L2”) if t1 ; t2 : L1! L2 for
some t1 and t2.
Translational equivalence is strictly stronger than intertranslatability. In particular, as
we will now show, CPL and IPL are intertranslatable but not translationally equivalent.
Definition 2.9 (Lindenbaum-Tarski Algebra). LetL  xL ;(y be a logic. TheLindenbaum-
Tarski algebra of L is the poset L  xL{ ;¤ywhere L{  is the class of-classes
on L and where rsL ; r sL P L{ , rsL ¤ r sL iff  (  (it is easy to verify this is
well-defined since ( is transitive).
Proposition 2.10. CPL   IPL but not CPL! IPL.
Proof: We sawabove thatCPL IPL via the double-negation translation. Moreover,
by Theorem 3.5 below, IPL CPL. Thus, CPL   IPL. Suppose t; s : CPL! IPL.
Define f : CPL Ñ IPL and g : IPL Ñ CPL such that f (rsCPL)  rt()sIPL and
g(rsIPL)  rs()sCPL (this is well-defined since translations preserve equivalence).
5See, e.g., Pelletier and Urquhart [2003, p. 269], Caleiro and Gonçalves [2007, p. 108], Straßburger [2007, p.
139], and French [2010, p. 134].
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It is easy to check that f and g are order-embeddings such that f (g(rsIPL))  rsIPL
and g( f (rsCPL))  rsCPL. Thus, if CPL! IPL, then CPL and IPL would be
order-isomorphic, ☇. ∎
There is an even stronger notion of equivalence between logics, viz., that of isomor-
phism:
Definition 2.11 (Isomorphism). We will say L1 is isomorphic to L2, written as “L1 
L2”, if there is a bijective t : L1 L2.
Observe that if t : L1 L2 is bijective, then t1 : L2 L1, and therefore t; t1 : L1! L2.
Thus, isomorphism implies translational equivalence. The converse can fail for trivial car-
dinality reasons. For example, let CPL be the result of adding uncountably many “re-
dundant” unary operators△r for each r P  such that△r CPL . Then CPL!CPL
but CPL  CPL. Yet intuitively, CPL is a notational variant of CPL. After all, each△r
is quite straightforwardly definable in CPL, and intuitively, adding definable operators to
a logic does not yield a new logic. Hence, requiring notational variants to be isomorphic
would be unreasonably restrictive. One would prefer a weaker notion of notational vari-
ance (such as translational equivalence) on which such artificial cardinality considerations
are not deemed essential to a logic.
So suppose we stipulate for a moment that two logics are notational variants just in
case they are translationally equivalent. We will now show that L1 L2 just in case L1 is a
notational variant of a fragment of L2.
Definition 2.12 (Fragment). Let L1 and L2 be logics. We will say L1 is a fragment of
L2 (written as “L1  L2”) if (a) L1  L2, and (b) for all    L1 and  P L1:   (1 
iff   (2 .
Proposition 2.13. Let L1 and L2 be logics. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) L1 L2.
(b) There is an L12  L2 such that L1   L12.
(c) There is an L12  L2 such that L1!L12.
Proof: Obviously, (c) implies (b), which implies (a) (since the composition of two
translations is also a translation). To show that (a) implies (c), let t : L1 L2. Define
Ltr1s  xtrL1s;(tr1sy where tr s (tr1s t() iff tr s (2 t(). By definition, Ltr1s 
L2. Hence, it suffices to show that L1!Ltr1s.
Now, t1 (the inverse of t) may not be a function from trL1s toL1, since tmight
not be injective. But since t1 is total on trL1s, we can always find a function t 
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t1 (using the axiom of choice) by selecting a  P t 1 P L1 | t( 1)   u arbitrarily
for each  P Ltr1s and setting t()   . Observe that t is a right-inverse of t, i.e.,
for all  P trL1s, t(t())  . Using this fact, it is straightforward to verify that
t; t : L1! Ltr1s. ∎
Hence, if notational variance is translational equivalence, then to show that L1 is a
translatable into L2 just is to show that L1 is a notational variant of a fragment of L2.
§3 Translating First-Order Logic into Propositional Logic
We will now show that first-order logic is translationally equivalent with propositional
logic. In fact, we will show any logic satisfying a few simple properties can be translated
into propositional logic.
Definition 3.1 (Monotonic Logic). We will say a logic Lmonotonic if for all  ;  L
such that     and for all  P L, if   (L , then  (L .
(Note I am using “monotonic” here in a sense different from the sense of “monotonic”
when applied specifically to non-normal modal logics. In what follows, I will only use
“monotonic” in the sense of §3.)
Definition 3.2 (Compact Logic). We will say a logic L is compact if for all    L and
 P L,   (L  only if for some finite  0   ,  0 (L .
The following result is due to Jeřábek [2012]:
Theorem 3.3 (Jeřábek). Let L be a compact monotonic logic with at most countably
many formulas. Then L CPL.
Jeřábek provides an explicit construction of the translation and shows that the translation
is Turing-equivalent to the consequence relation of the source logic. This is quite gen-
eral, but the details of the proof are quite involved. What is more, the construction is not
guaranteed to produce a translation scheme. This raises the question of whether FOL and
CPL are translationally equivalent. We will now show the answer is affirmative. Unlike
Jeřábek’s constructive proof, our proof will go indirectly via Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras.
First, some terminology. A poset xP;¤y is ameet-semilattice if every finite subset of P has
a greatest lower bound.
Definition 3.4 (Adjunctive Logic). A logic L is adjunctive if for any    L, if there is
a formula  such that rsL 

P  rsL, then   (L . We will often write such a 
as “

 ” given it exists.
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Theorem 3.5. Let L1 and L2 be compact monotonic adjunctive logics. Suppose also
that 1 and 2 are meet-semilattices.
(a) L1 L2 iff there is an order-embedding from 1 to 2 that preserves finite
meets.
(b) L1!L2 iff 1 is order-isomorphic to 2.
(c) L1  L2 iff there is an f : 1  2 where |rs1|  | f (rs1)| for each  P L1.
Proof: The left-to-right directions are straightforward. For the right-to-left direc-
tions:
(a) Let f : L1{ 1Ñ L2{ 2 be an order-embedding that preserves finite meets.
For each rs1 P L1{ 1, let frs1 : rs1 Ñ f (rs1) be an arbitrary map. Define
t()  frs1 (). Since L1 is compact,   (1  iff for some finite  1   ,  1 (1
. And if  1 is finite, then  1 (1  iff   1 (1  (  1 exists since 1 is a
meet-semilattice). Likewise, tr s (2 t() iff tr 1s (2 t() for some finite
 1   , and tr 1s (2 t() iff tr 1s (2 t(). Since f preserves finite meets,
P 1 f (rs1)  f (





tr 1s 2 t(  1). So to
show that t is a translation, it suffices to show that for any ;  P L1,  (1  
iff t() (2 t( ). But  (1  iff rs1 ¤1 r s1, iff f (rs1) ¤2 f (r s1), iff
t() (2 t( ). So t : L1 L2.
(b) Let f : L1{ 1Ñ L2{ 2 be an order-isomorphism. As before, for each rs1 PL1{ 1, let frs1 : rs1 Ñ f (rs1) be an arbitrary map. Likewise, for each
r s2 P L2{ 2, let gr s2 : r s2 Ñ f 1(r s2) be arbitrary. Define t() 
frs1 () and s( )  gr s2 ( ). The reasoning above shows that t : L1 L2
and s : L2 L1. Now, let  P L1. Then  1 s(t()) iff rs1  rs(t())s1 
f 1(rt()s2)  f 1( f (rs1))  rs1. So  1 s(t()) for all  P L1. Likewise,
 1 t(s( )) for all  P L2. Hence, t; s : L1! L2.
(c) Under these conditions, we can take each frs1 to be bijective, making t as a
whole bijective. ∎
Corollary 3.6. FOL  CPL.
Proof: Immediate since FOL and CPL are countable atomless Boolean algebras
and any two countable atomless Boolean algebras are isomorphic. ∎
Note that such an isomorphism is obviously undecidable. One might try to block this
result by requiring notational variants to be Turing-equivalent. But this requirement is
both too weak and too strong. On the one hand, it is too weak, since monadic first-order
logic, which is decidable, would still be deemed to be a notational variant of propositional
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logic. On the other hand, it is too strong, since it seems plausible that some notational
variants of a logic can be more computationally efficient than others. We can illustrate this
point with a simple example.
Example 3.7. Let X  N be a nonrecursive set, and let LProp(') be the result of
adding countablymany binary connectives'i (where i P N) toLProp. Wewill define
the logic CPL' semantically. The semantics for atomics and the standard boolean
connectives is the same as before. The semantics of 'i is as follows: if i P X, then
 'i  is true on a valuation iff  and  are true on that valuation; if i < X, then
 'i  is true on a valuation iff  or  is true on that valuation. Finally, CPL' 
xLProp(');('y, where   ('  iff  is true on every valuation on which   is true.
Intuitively, CPL' is a notational variant of CPL. After all, each 'i is definable in
terms of connectives in CPL: CPL(') is just CPL with infinitely many connectives
expressing conjunction or disjunction. But CPL' is not decidable, since a decision
procedure for CPL' would generate a decision procedure for X (just check to see if
p (' p 'i q).
Thus, we cannot avoid Theorem 3.5 by appealing to computability considerations. Some-
thing else must explain why FOL and CPL are not merely notational variants.
Corollary 3.6 allows us to define a t and s such that t; s : FOL!CPL that preserves
the boolean connectives exactly:
Proposition 3.8. There are some t; s : FOL!CPL such that t(:)  : t() and
t( ^  )  t() ^ t( ) (and likewise for s).
Proof: Let i : FOL CPL be bijective. Define t and s as follows:
t(Pn (y1 ; : : : ; yn))  i(Pn (y1 ; : : : ; yn)) s(p)  i1(p)
t(:)  : t() s(:)  : s()
t( ^  )  t() ^ t( ) s( ^  )  s() ^ s( )
t(@x )  i(@x i1(t())):
It is straightforward to check by induction that t() CPL i() for all  P LPred
and s( ) FOL i1( ) for all  P LProp. Hence, for any  P LPred, s(t()) FOL
i1(i())  . Likewise, for any  P LProp, t(s( )) CPL i(i1( ))   . So
t; s : FOL!CPL.
It is interesting to note that there is no isomorphism between FOL and CPL with this
property. If there were such an i, then it would have to map both atomic predicate for-
mulas and quantified formulas to atomic propositional formulas (e.g., if i(F(x))  : ,
then F(x)  i1(i(F(x)))  i1(: )  : i1(), contrary to the fact that F(x) has no nega-
tion, ☇). But then i(@x F(x)) and i(F(x)) would need to be logically independent atomic
formulas, contrary to the fact that @x F(x) (FOL F(x), ☇.
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§4 Compositionality & Schematicity
The notion of a translation as defined inDefinition 2.2 is fairly minimal. In theory, a trans-
lation could be quite gerrymandered and complex. In practice, most translations that have
been studied are fairly schematic. Usually one defines a translation by first defining how to
translate the atomic formulas, and then settling how to define the translation of complex
formulas in terms of their parts via another schema. And indeed, the translations from
FOL to CPL described in Theorem 3.5 and in Proposition 3.8 do not have this property.
This suggests the thesis that two logics are notational variants just in case they are trans-
lationally equivalent via schematic translations. In this section, we will explore different
ways of fleshing out this idea.
First, to explicate this idea more precisely, we need to build more structure into the
definition of a logic. As it stands, a logic is just a class of formulas together with a con-
sequence relation on those formulas. Nothing in Definition 2.1 demands that the class of
formulas a logic is built from must have any underlying compositional structure. Thus, if
we want to make use of the notion of schematicity, the definition of a logic must include a
specification of its underlying syntactic structure.
Definition 4.1 (Signature). A signature is a pair   xAt; Opy where At and Op are
nonempty classes and Op is a class of pairs x△; y where △ is a set and  is an
ordinal. The -syntax is the smallest class L such that:
(i) for all  P At, xy P L
(ii) for all x△; y P Op and all  P L ( the class of -sequences of elements ofL), x△; y P L (we may write “△()” in place of “x△; y”).
We call the members of L the -formulas. A -logic is a pair x;(y where  is a
signature and xL ;(y is a logic in the sense of Definition 2.1. A translation from
L1  x1 ;(1y to L2  x2 ;(2y is just a translation from xL1 ;(1y to xL2 ;(2y.
A number of authors have claimed that for two logics to be notational variants, there
need to exist some compositional translations between them.6 Tomake this precise, we need
the following definition:
Definition 4.2 (Schema). Let   xAt; Opy be a signature, and let  be disjoint from
L. A-schemawithparameters in is a()-formulawhere()  xAtY; Opy.
If  P L and if() is a -schema where  is a -sequence listing the parameters
in , we may write “()” for the -formula obtained by replacing each () in
() with () for    .
6Epstein [1990, p. 391] uses the term “grammatical” instead of “compositional”. Kracht and Wolter [1999,
p. 100], Pelletier and Urquhart [2003, p. 269] and Caleiro and Gonçalves [2007, p. 108] build compositionality
into the definition of a translation from the start.
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Definition 4.3 (Compositionality). Let L1 and L2 be 1- and 2-logics respectively. A
translation t : L1 L2 is compositional if for all △ P Op1, there is an 2-schema
△() such that for all  P L1 , t(△())  △(t  ).
The existence of a translation from one logic to another does not in general imply the
existence of a compositional translation from the former to the latter. In particular, there
is no compositional translation from FOL to CPL, nor one from IPL to CPL.7 On the other
hand, there is a compositional translation from CPL to FOL and a compositional transla-
tion from CPL to IPL. Compositional translations can also be used to distinguish CPL and
most normal modal logics:
Proposition 4.4. If L is a normal modal logic and if t : L CPL is compositional,
then ◻ L  _◻K.
Proof: Suppose◻() is aLCPL-schema such that t(◻)  ◻(t()). Observe that
◻(t()) CPL (t() ^ l)_ (: t() ^ ), where l and  are some LCPL-formulas.
Since (L ◻J, we have that (CPL t(◻J) CPL (t(J) ^ l) _ (: t(J) ^ ) CPL l.
Hence, t(◻) CPL t() _ . Thus, t() (CPL t(◻), and so  (L ◻, from
which it follows that ◻ L  _◻K. ∎
Most translations that have been studied in the literature are compositional. So one
might suspect we could simply postulate that two logics are notational variants just in
case they are compositionally translationally equivalent. But this would be too restrictive.
For instance, a number of modal logicians see the van Benthem characterization theorem
as showing that modal logic is just (a notational variant of) the bisimulation-invariant
fragment of first-order logic via the standard translation.8 But the standard translation
of modal logic into first-order logic is not compositional according to Definition 4.3.9 In
particular, consider the ◻-clause:
STn (◻)  @xn 1 (R(xn ; xn 1) Ñ STn 1()) :
Since STn () does not occur anywhere as a subformula of STn (◻) (rather, STn 1()
does), and since compositional translations are required to have the translations of their
constituents as subformulas, STn is not compositional. In fact, it can be shown that there is
no compositional t : K FOL, whereK is the minimal normal modal logic. The following
is proved in the appendix:10
7This follows from Theorems 4.7 and 4.8 below. There are also more direct proofs of these claims. For
instance, suppose there were a compositional t : FOL CPL. Then where  is the CPL-schema such that
t(@x )  (t()), we have t(@xJ)  (t(J)) CPL (J). Hence, t() (CPL t() Ø J (CPL (t()) Ø
(J) (CPL (t())  t(@x ) for any  P LPred. But then  (FOL @x  for any  P LPred, ☇.
8See, e.g., Andréka et al. [1998, p. 1] and Blackburn et al. [2001, p. 70].
9Mossakowski et al. Mossakowski et al. [2009, p. 4] make this observation as well, though they do not offer
any alternative notion in its place.
10The theorem cannot be extended to all normal modal logics, since there is a compositional translation
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Theorem 4.5. Let L be a normal modal logic. If t : L FOL is compositional, then◻ L ◻◻.
Hence, it would be too restrictive to demand that notational variants be composition-
ally translationally equivalent. Still, arguably there is a sense in which the standard trans-
lation is nearly compositional. The problem with the definition of compositionality (Def-
inition 4.3) is that sometimes a translation can only be defined simultaneously with other
translations. This is what the standard translation ofmodal logic into first-order logic illus-
trates. But intuitively, that should not matter. What is important is not that the translation
of a complex formula is strictly a schema of the translation of the parts, but rather that the
translation of a complex formula is uniform and fixed solely by its syntactic structure. This
motivates a more general notion of compositionality along the following lines:11
Definition 4.6 (Schematicity). Let L1 and L2 be 1- and 2-logics respectively, and
let T be a class of translations from L1 to L2. We will say T is compositionally in-
terdependent if for each t P T and for each△ P Op1, there is an 2-schema △()
with a -sequence of distinct parameters  and there is a  P T such that for all
 P L1 , t(△())  △(  ), where we define (  )()  ()(()). We will say
a translation is schematic if it is a member of a compositionally interdependent set.a
aWe could also require schematic translations to translate atomic formulas schematically. Such a
constraint seems well-motivated, but it was not included in this definition for purposes of generality,
as it was not necessary in the results to follow.
If t is compositional, then it is a member of a compositionally interdependent set, but
not vice versa, as the standard translation from K into FOL shows. So the fact that no
compositional translation from FOL to CPL exists does not immediately imply that there
is no schematic translation from FOL to CPL. Fortunately, with a little more work, we can
achieve this result as well.
Theorem 4.7. There is no schematic t : FOL CPL.
Proof: Suppose there were such a t. Let () be a CPL-schema with a single pa-
rameter  and let t1 : FOL CPL be such that t(Dx )  (t1()) (such a schema
must exist if there are such schemas for @x and :). Then(CPL t(J) CPL t(DxJ) 
(t1(J)) CPL (J) (since t1(J) CPL J). Hence, t1() (CPL t1() Ø J (CPL
(t1()) Ø (J) (CPL (t1())  t(Dx ). So t1() (CPL t(Dx ) for all  P
LFOL.
Now, (t1());: t1() (CPL (K). Moreover, : t1(K) (CPL t1(K) Ø K (CPL
from S5 to FOL (setting t(◻)  @x t()). It is unknown whether the result extends to other logics like S4
that validate◻Ø ◻◻.
11The definition is inspired by the definition of “recursive” translations from French [2010, p. 16], who
attributes the definition to Steven Kuhn.
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(t1(K)) Ø (K). So t(Dx );: t1();: t1(K) (CPL (t1(K)). But t1(K) (CPL
(t1(K)), so either way, t(Dx );: t1() (CPL (t1(K))  t(DxK) CPL t(K).
Hence, t(Dx ) (CPL t1()_t(K). Moreover, the converse holds too, since t1() (CPL
t(Dx ) and t(K) (CPL t(Dx ). So t(Dx ) CPL t1() _ t(K) for all  P LFOL.
Now, observe that if s : FOL CPL, s(^ ) CPL s()^s( ) for any ;  P LFOL.
Thus, we have t(Dx ^Dx :) CPL t(Dx )^t(Dx :) (CPL (t1()^t1(:))_
t(K) CPL t1( ^ :) _ t(K) CPL t1(K) _ t(K) CPL t(DxK) CPL t(K), ☇. ∎
Wehave yet to find a natural example of a pair of logics L1 and L2 that are schematically
intertranslatable but not schematically translationally equivalent. Given Proposition 2.10,
onemightwonderwhether IPL andCPL couldwitness schematic intertranslatabilitywith-
out schematic translational equivalence. The answer is negative:
Theorem 4.8. There is no schematic t : IPL CPL.
Proof: Suppose therewere a such a t. Let() be aCPL-schema and let t1 : IPL CPL
be such that t(:)  (t1()). Then (CPL t(J)  t(:K)  (t1(K)). So (CPL
(t1(K)). So t1(:) (CPL t1( Ø K) (CPL t1() Ø t1(K) (CPL (t1()) Ø
(t1(K)) (CPL (t1()). So t1(:) (CPL t(:).
Since(CPL t1(K)_: t1(K) and(CPL (t1(K)), we have that(CPL (J)_(K).
Now, t(K) (CPL t(:); so: t(:) (CPL : t(K) CPL : t(:J)  :(t1(J)) CPL
:(J) (CPL (K) (CPL (t1(:)) (since: t(:) (CPL : t1(:) (CPL t1(:) Ø
K). Thus,: t(:) (CPL (t1(:))  t(::). Hence,(CPL t(:)_: t(:) (CPL
t(:) _ t(::). But t() _ t( ) (CPL t( _  ). So (CPL t(: _ ::), even
though *IPL : _ ::. ∎
These results suggest that amore adequate precisification of the concept of notational vari-
ance can be stated in terms of schematicity: two logics are notational variants just in case
they are schematically translationally equivalent.
This is not to say that schematic translational equivalence is the correct precisification
of notational variance. Perhaps onewill find this particular precisification too restrictive or
too general, in which case one might want to explore other notions of notational variance
for different purposes. It might turn out that there simply is no unique precisification of
this informal concept. Still, schematic translational equivalence at least seems to be an
improvement over other notions in the literature in its ability to align more closely with
our intuitive judgments.
§5 Conclusion
Translations are often employed as a way of determining whether or not one logic is a no-
tational variant of a fragment of another. We saw, however, that most attempts to precisify
the concept of a notational variant using translations are either too weak or too strong.
If, on the one hand, we stipulate that translational equivalence is sufficient for notational
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variance, then we will be forced to say that first-order logic and propositional logic are
notational variants. If, on the other hand, we require notational variants to be composi-
tionally intertranslatable, then modal logic will not be a notational variant of a fragment
of first-order logic. Fortunately, we saw that we could balance between these two propos-
als by stipulating that two logics are notational variants just in case they are schematically
translationally equivalent. Thus, equating notational variancewith schematic translational
equivalence seems to be a plausible alternative to the previous accounts of notational vari-
ance.
§A Proof of Theorem 4.5
Let () be a first-order schema such that t(◻)  (t()). Without loss of generality,
we may assume () is in (roughly) prenex normal form, i.e., that:
(t())  Q1y1 : : :Qn yn ((t() ^ l) _ (: t() ^ ))
where l and  are boolean combinations of atomic FOL-formulas and each Qi P t@ ; Du.
Observe that:
(FOL t(◻J)  Q1y1 : : :Qn yn ((t(J) ^ l) _ (: t(J) ^ )) FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn l:
So (FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn l.
First, we show ◻ (L ◻◻. Using the fact that (FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn l:
t(◻) (FOL t(◻) ^ Q1y1 : : :Qn yn l
FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn (t(◻) ^ l) ;
since y1 ; : : : ; yn are already bound in t(◻). So:
t(◻) (FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn (t(◻) ^ l)
(FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn ((t(◻) ^ l) _ (: t(◻) ^ ))
 t(◻◻):
Hence, t(◻) (FOL t(◻◻), and thus, ◻ (L ◻◻.
Next, we show ◻◻ (L ◻. Observe that:
(t()) FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn ((t() _ ) ^ (: t() _ l))
So:
t(◻◻) FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn ((t(◻) _ ) ^ (: t(◻) _ l))
(FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn (t(◻) _ )
FOL t(◻) _ Q1y1 : : :Qn yn 
FOL t(◻) _  : t(◻) ^ Q1y1 : : :Qn yn 
FOL  t(◻) ^ Q1y1 : : :Qn yn l _  : t(◻) ^ Q1y1 : : :Qn yn 
FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn (t(◻) ^ l) _ Q1y1 : : :Qn yn (: t(◻) ^ )
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(FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn ((t(◻) ^ l) _ (: t(◻) ^ ))
 t(◻◻):
Thus, in particular, t(◻◻) FOL t(◻)_Q1y1 : : :Qn yn . Now, note that t(^ ) FOL
t() ^ t( ). Hence, unpacking t(◻( ^  )):
t(◻( ^  )) FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn ((t( ^  ) ^ l) _ (: t( ^  ) ^ ))
FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn ((t( ^  ) ^ l) _ (: (t() ^ t( )) ^ ))
FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn ((t( ^  ) ^ l) _ ((: t() _ : t( )) ^ ))
FOL Q1y1 : : :Qn yn ((t( ^  ) ^ l) _ (: t() ^ ) _ (: t( ) ^ )) :
Since◻(^ ) (L ◻, and sinceQ1y1 : : :Qn yn (: t( )^) (FOL t(◻(^ ) (given the
last equivalence above), that means thatQ1y1 : : :Qn yn (: t( )^) (FOL t(◻) for any 
and  . In particular, Q1y1 : : :Qn yn (: t(◻) ^ ) FOL : t(◻) ^Q1y1 : : :Qn yn  (FOL
t(◻). Hence, Q1y1 : : :Qn yn  (FOL t(◻). Thus, we have that t(◻◻) FOL t(◻). ∎
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